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The J o hn Marshall Journal
Of Practice and Procedure
Volume 4

Winter Term, 1970

Number 1

CONFLICT OF LAWS AND THE INTEREST
ANALYSIS - AN EXAMPLE FOR ILLINOIS
by DAVID P. EARLE III*

"Bad law makes hard cases."
- Professor Brainerd Currie'
The automobile and the airplane. In our highly mobile society it is no surprise that accidents involving the automobile and

the airplane occur under circumstances which are multi-state or
multi-country in nature.

One troublesome result of this fact is

that courts have found it difficult to frame rational rules to determine which state's or which country's law applies to such accidents. The traditional common law approach, lex loci delicti, was
strictly geographical in nature and applied the law of the state
in which the accident occurred. This rule provides that all substantive rights and liabilities of the parties arising out of tortious
conduct are determined by the law of the place of the wrong.'
Although the rule has the advantage of guaranteeing certainty as
to which jurisdiction's law to apply in most situations, it was
widely criticized by most authorities as entirely too mechanical,
unjust in result, and subject to a proliferating number of escape
3
devices and manipulation by the courts in actual practice.
* A.B., Williams College; J.D., M. Comp. L., The University of Chicago
Law School. Instructor, The John Marshall Law School. Lawyer, Law
Department, The First National Bank of Chicago.
I B. Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-ofLaws Methods, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 227, 245 (1958), reprinted in B. CURRIE,
SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 2 (1963) [hereinafter cited as

Currie].
This author had the privilege of studying conflicts under the late Professor Brainerd Currie while a student at The University of Chicago Law
School. This author also elected to use the casebook prepared by Professors
Cramton and Currie, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES - COMMENTS - QUESTIONS
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Cramton & Currie] in a conflicts course at
The John Marshall Law School. This latter Currie is, of course, the earlier
Currie's son. Although neither this author nor the casebook Currie are
necessarily acolytes at the altar of the pure Currie non-balancing, nonweighing interest analysis (see, e.g., D. Currie, in Comments on Reich v.
Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 551, 595 (1968), it is probably preferable to
isolate one's prejudice at the outset. All the more so, I suppose, in light
of a muffled comment from the back of the John Marshall classroom "Currie,
the Father, Currie, the Son, and now Currie the Holy Ghost."
2
See

RESTATEMENT

(FIRST)

OF

CONFLICT

OF

LAWS

§384

(1934)

[hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (FIRST) ].
8 The most recent compendia of the critical literature, as well as the
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Seven years ago, the New York Court of Appeals decided in
a seminal case to discard the lex loci delicti rule previously applied in word, if not in deed, by virtually every court in the
United States. In Babcock v. Jackson4 the court held that a New
York auto passenger could recover from a New York driver under
New York law, although both the negligent act and the injury
occurred in Ontario, where a guest statute would have barred recovery. Since Babcock in New York, no fewer than fifteen
states, including Illinois, 5 have also abandoned the lex loci delicti
rule, at least in part, and endorsed new solutions of tort choiceof-law problems in one form or another."
A substantial number of the cases that have spawned the

"revolution" in conflicts law involved automobile and airplane

accidents, 7 an area which is increasingly controversial even when
no conflicts question is presented. The problems of congested
courts, compensation-without-fault schemes, fluctuating awards
and Warsaw Convention damage limitations in international
flights have also resulted in a questioning of the application of
traditional tort rules and procedures. The thought of superimposing additional complexity over already vexing problems by
adopting new rules or a more "flexible approach" may have been

lurking behind the announced fears of those courts which have
refused outright to utilize the new conflicts learning. Out of respect for certainty and stare decisis, these courts still feel bound
to look exclusively to the state of injury for the substantive rules
governing multi-state torts."
current methodologies, may be found in two representative articles, Juenger,
Choice of Law in Interstate Torts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 202 (1969), and
Peterson, Developments in American Conflict of Laws: Torts, 1969 U. ILL.
L.F. 289. A useful recent annotation is Rystrom, Modern Status of
Rule that Substantive Rights of Parties to a Tort Action Are Governed
by the Law of the Place of the Wrong, ANNOT., 29 A.L.R.3d 603 (1970).
412
N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 140 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
5 Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966).
6 Armstrong v. Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699 (Alaska 1968); Schwartz v.
Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968); Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal.
2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967); Fabricus v. Horgen, 257
Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965); Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky.
1967); Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968); Mitchell
v. Craft, 211 So.2d 509 (Miss. 1968); Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173
(Mo. 1969) ; Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Mellk v.
Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625 (1967); Casey v. Manson Constr. &
Eng'r Co., 247 Ore. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967) ; Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc.,
416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Woodward v. Stewart, 243 A.2d 917 (R.I.
1968), petition for cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 957 (1969); Conklin v. Horner,
38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968).
Of the fifteen cases cited in notes 4, 5 and 6 supra, fourteen involved
automobile accidents and one involved an airplane crash.
8 See, e.g., Friday v. Smoot, 211 A.2d 594 (Del. 1965); White v. King,
244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966) ; Abendschein v. Farrell, 382 Mich. 510,
170 N.W.2d 137 (1969); Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 58
(Tex. Civ. App. 1967), aff'd, 430 S.W.2d 182 (1968). For a case which
continues to follow lex loci delicti, but reserves further consideration in
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Perhaps as significant as the counter-list of decisions rejecting the new approach are the growing pains of those states
which have attempted to make a break with traditional learning
by considering contacts other than the lex loci, thrusting some
consideration of policy to the forefront. After referring to the
experience in New York and Wisconsin, then, this paper will
turn to the situation in Illinois and attempt to essay the direction
in which this state is heading. Some prefatory remarks about
what is meant by the "interest analysis," however, would seem
to be in order.
I.

The "Interest Analysis"

At least for the purposes of this paper, the phrase "interest
analysis" means some focus upon the interpretation of the substantive rules of law competing for application in a case with
multi-state elements, in light of the purpose of such rules. The
inquiry therefore begins with a consideration of the content and
purpose of a possibly applicable law.
Admittedly, the analysis and tests used by the courts vary
in depth and phraseology and may be considered to differ in result. Nor can it be denied that there are considerable terminological differences among those scholars who, in common with
Professors Cavers 9 and Currie, favor an interest analysis as the
first step in a choice-of-law case. Indeed, there are others, like
Professor Leflar, who isolate the advancement of the forum's
governmental interest as only one of five considerations." Nevertheless, "interest analysis or something very much like it has
been employed by quite a number of courts"'" and promulgated by
a significant group of commentators - though by no means all
of them - in the last decade.
Professor Currie spoke of "interests," "policies," and the
"ordinary processes of construction and interpretation," Cavers
prefers to speak of "purposes," while Leflar opts for "choice-influencing considerations," and Professors von Mehren and Trautman denominate their approach a "functional analysis. ' 112 Courts
rely on "forum policy," use the terms "governmental interest,"
a different factual setting, see Browing v. Shackleford, 196 So.2d 365
(Miss. 1967).
9D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAw PROCESS (1965).
10 R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW (rev. ed. 1968)
cited as Leflar]. The five considerations are as follows:

[hereinafter

(A) Predictability of results;
(B)

Maintenance of interstate and international order;

(C) Simplification of the judicial task;
(D) Advancement of the forum's governmental interest;
(E) Application of the better rule of law.

4 Cramton & Currie 256.
VON MEHREN & TRAUTMAN,
(1965).
.

12

THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS
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"concern," "false conflict," and determine which state has the
"most significant relationship" with the litigated matters, which
is the test of the Second Restatement.1 3 Whatever the choice in
terminology or approach, whenever a court deems itself free to
make a reasoned choice among potentially applicable rules of decisions, with some consideration of substantive policy or at least
an abandonment of mechanical rules, it should be considered to
'1
be exercising an "interest analysis."'
One caveat is important here. Most of the modern opinions
combine references to significant contacts or relationships with
discussions of the scope of policy, much as the New York Court
of Appeals did in Babcock. As that case illustrates, the significant-contacts or significant-relationship test of the Second Restatement tends to become an interest analysis when the significance of a contact is assessed in terms of the policies underlying
each state's law. In the absence of consideration of the content
and purpose of the law, however, the significant-contacts test becomes a jurisdiction-selecting rule with little in common with the
interest approach. The former approach is just as mechanical
and subject to the same difficulties and criticism as is the sterile
systematics of the vested-rights or lex loci approach of the traditional learning and the First Restatement of Conflicts.
II.

Growing Pains in New York and Wisconsin
The experience of other state courts is instructive not only
as a reflection of how the theories behind the new approaches
work out in practice, but also because Illinois attorneys and Illinois courts thereby have reference poles to which they can point
in advocating acceptance or rejection of, or deciding for or
against adoption of, an interest analysis.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, on the one hand, seems to
have settled down and now expressly invokes Professor Leflar's
choice-influencing considerations,"' after running the gamut of
most of the theories. New York, as the other example, appears
to have finally embraced a strict interest analysis, including
weighing the policies underlying competing rules of laws, 6 yet
13

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF

CONFLICT

OF

LAWS

§145

(Proposed

Official Draft, part II, 1968) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)).
14 The most articulate of the early exponents of the interest analysis,
Professor Currie, concluded that given a legitimate interest in its application,
forum law must be applied irrespective of any countervailing interest of
some other jurisdiction, without any weighing or balancing to find one more
substantial or predominant than the other. Currie ch 4. He also urged
courts to exercise restraint and moderation in determining the forum's interest and a modicum of altruism in recognizing other states' competing
interests. The use of the phrase "interest analysis" in this paper, however,
is not meant to subsume the non-balancing aspect of pristine Currie theory.
'5 Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968).
' Tooker
v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 Nr.Y.S.2d
519 (1969).
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along the way "the Court of Appeals has hopped frenetically
17
from one theory to another like an overheated jumping bean.'
In New York, uncertainty as to the proper approach was not
limited to the classic series of guest-statute cases, more fully
described below. 1 8 In other kinds of tort cases, the bewildered
reader starts in 1961 with Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines,-9 where
it was held that Massachusetts law governs liability for a New
Yorker's death in an airplane crash in Massachusetts, but the
Massachusetts death damage limitation was not applied on the
grounds that it was procedural and contrary to New York public
policy. A year later in Davenport v. Webb,2 0 the "procedural"
basis for Kilberg was abandoned, but the court found that the
foreign law respecting pre-judgment interest in a wrongful death
case was substantive and not contrary to New York public policy.
In 1965 in Long v. Pan American World Airways,2 1 the death act
and survival statute of Pennsylvania rather than Maryland were
applied to the death of Pennsylvania passengers killed when a
plane disintegrated in flight near the Delaware-Maryland border,
the wreckage being found in the vicinity of Elkton, Maryland.
The "fortuitousness" of the place of the accident was stressed,
citing Kilberg, the "significant contacts" pointed to Pennsylvania
(place where tickets purchased, survivors resident, flight origin
and termination), and New York, although the state where the
defendant airline was incorporated, was found to be a "neutral
forum," which circumstance did not warrant the application of
its substantive law or the interposition of its public policy. Farber v. Smolack. 22 a 1967 decision, seemed to apply a hybrid doctrine, cross-breeding the "fortuity" concept of Kilberg and Long
with Babcock's analysis of contacts in terms of policy. The
court applied a New York statute, rather than a statute of North
Carolina, attributing the negligent operation of an automobile
to its owner in an action arising out of a North Carolina accident,
where all the persons involved were domiciliaries of New York.
The court took this action even though the New York statute
used the term "operation and use in this state." This hybrid approach - variously known as the "center of gravity" or the
"grouping of contacts" theory of conflicts - was apparently rejected a year later, when in 1968 in Miller v. Miller,23 a Maine
limitation on death damages was ignored in an action arising
17 Cramton & Currie 258-59.

A chronological index of selected New

York cases through early 1968 may be found in this work on pages 259-60.
18 See text inf'a at notes 30 to 39.
199 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
20 11 N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E.2d 902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962).
2116 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965).
22

20 N.Y.2d 198, 229 N.E.2d 36 282 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1967).
N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).

23 22
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from the death of a New York passenger in a car driven by a
Maine resident in Maine. Because the defendant had moved to

New York after the accident, Maine had no concern with protecting him from excessive liability, and therefore, no interest of
Maine would be infringed upon by allowing full recovery. Party
expectations were no obstacle either because the damage limitation was not the kind of statute upon which a person would rely

in governing his conduct. New York, the court found, had the
"predominant interest.24
The treatment of the "public policy" 2 defense during this
period is no more enlightening. In 1964, for example, in Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Golden,2 6 a government-licensed gambling casino in Puerto Rico advanced $12,000 in credit to a New
York customer, with the result that it was promptly lost at the

gambling tables. When he failed to pay, the casino sought to recover the debt in New York, which not only forbids enforcement
of gambling contracts, gambling being a criminal offense there,
but also allows a loser to recover from the winner in a civil action.
With two judges dissenting, the court held that enforcement of a

gambling debt, valid where incurred, did not so offend justice or
menace the public welfare of New York that its courts must withhold aid. In a case decided a year later, another New Yorker,
also on a visit to Puerto Rico, was injured when she slipped and
24 Other related cases might be cited. For example, in Thomas v.
United Air Lines, Inc. 24 N.Y.2d 714, 249 N.E.2d 755, 301 N.Y.S.2d 973
(1969), the Court of Appeals held that actions for the wrongful death of
passengers killed when a United Air Lines Boeing 727 crashed into Lake
Michigan within the territorial boundary of Illinois were not restricted
by the then existing Illinois $30,000 limitation. Thomas is as interesting
for the court's reversion to stressing the "fortuitous locality" of the accident
(now possibly taken for granted in at least all airplane cases, as opposed
to automobile injuries), as it is for a kind of renvoi reference to Illinois and
federal law, indicating to the court that neither Illinois nor federal law
would apply the Illinois limitation either. The Thomas court cited the
leading "modern" Illinois conflicts case, Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill. 2d 57,
213 N.E.2d 544 (1966), which rejected lex loci delicti in the interspousal
immunity context, discussed in the text at note 68 infra.
25 It should be kept in mind that the interest analysis differs in substance
and approach from the traditional doctrine permitting a court to disregard
a foreign law that is contrary to local public policy. It differs since the
public policy defense is just that - a "second-line defense" which the forum
court generally uses as a reason to refuse to apply what it has already decided would otherwise be the applicable law. It also differs in approach,
since an analysis of the "policies" of competing rules assesses in the first
instance the scope and content of all contending rules of law, while the
public policy argument is applied only to justify the application of forum law,
therefore becoming an amorphous substitute for analysis of whether in
fact the purpose of the contending foreign law actually does conflict with
the forum law in the factual framework presented for decision. To the
degree that the public policy defense is really used by the court as an
"escape device" to avoid the traditional rules, it resembles the interest
analysis, but only to the extent that the new approach reaches the same
result in the choice of law made. Any other similarity ends there. See
generally, Paulsen & Sovern, 'Public Policy' in the Conflict of Laws, 56
COLUM. L. REV. 969 (1956).
P1!5 N.Y.2d 9? 203 N.E.2d 210, 254 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1964).
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fell in a building insured by the defendant insurance company. A
unanimous court held in Oltarsh v. Aetna Casualty Ins. Co.,27 a
suit based on Puerto Rico's "direct action" statute, that Puerto
Rico's contacts and interests were predominant, the issue substantive and not procedural, and the statute not contrary to New
York Public policy.2 8 New York does not allow direct action
against insurance companies, and it has been held to be reversible
error in a personal injury case to reveal the fact of insurance
to the jury.2 9 These two decisions, Golden and Oltarsh, should
be contrasted with the Kilberg rejection of the Massachusetts
death damage limitation, and earlier New York cases refusing to
apply a foreign state's abolition of interspousal immunity,30 on
the grounds of forum public policy.
The classic clash of theories in New York occurred in the
guest statute series of cases, beginning in 1963 with that pioneer
of policy analysis, Babcock v. Jackson.s1 It should be recalled
that the court there rejected the lex loci delicti rule, and analyzed
contacts in terms of policy, holding that the Ontario guest statute
was inapplicable to a weekend accident in Ontario involving only
New Yorkers, New York having no guest statute. The test announced, two judges dissenting, was to give "controlling effect to
the law of the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or
contact with the occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation.'32 In deciding
to apply New York law, the court concluded that the concern of
that state was unquestionably the greater and more direct than
that of Ontario.
Two years later in Dym v. Gordon,3 a case similar to Babcock, the Court of Appeals resolved what it viewed as a true conflict between New York and Colorado law in favor of the latter's
guest statute, still analyzing the interests and the contacts but
coming to the opposite result. The distinguishing differences
seemed to be that the relationship between the New York host and
guest arose in Colorado, where both were attending summer
school, so that the accident, in the majority view, was not adventitious as in Babcock, and that because a third car was involved,
15 N.Y.2d 111, 204 N.E.2d 622, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1965).
Contra, Lieberthal v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 316 Mich. 37, 24
N.W.2d 547 (1946), and Marchlik v. Coronet Insurance Co., 40 Ill. 2d 327,
239 N.E.2d 799 (1968), discussed in the text at note 89 infra.
29 Kelly v. Yannotte,
4 N.Y.2d 603, 152 N.E.2d 69, 176 N.Y.S.2d
637 (1958).
0
' E.g., Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936).
31 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
Comments
on Babcock by Cavers, Cheatham, B. Currie, Ehrenzweig, Leflar and Reese
may be found in the symposium on that case in 63 COLUM. L. REV.
27
28

1212 (1963).
32 191 N.E.2d at,283, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
33 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).

The John MarshallJournalof Practiceand Procedure

[Vol. 4:1

a policy interest in Colorado's law to provide a fund for third parties was found to exist,34 although such a policy was not found to
be present when Ontario's law was examined in the earlier case.
The author of the Babcock decision dissented and was joined by
two other judges.
In Macey v. Rozbicki,85 the third major guest statute case,
Babcock and Dym were "reconciled" by a sterile counting of contacts divorced from any consideration of policy. New York law
was applied instead of Ontario, where the accident took place,
because, the court said, the relationship between the plaintiff and
defendant, both New York domiciliaries, had arisen in New York.
Unlike the situation in Babcock, however, the automobile trip in
question took place entirely within Ontario. Although this time
there was only one dissent, Judge Keating's concurrence in a
separate opinion was nothing less than prophetic. He argued
that where the relationship arose, where the trip was to begin
and end, and how short or long the visit, were irrelevant.
The only facts having any significant bearing on the applicable
choice of law in guest statute cases are the residence of the parties
and the place in which the automobile is insured and registered ...
since only these facts have any relation to the policies sought to be
vindicated by the ostensibly conflicting laws. And here as in Babcock neither the policies of New York nor Ontario will be furthered
by denying recovery.36
He then discussed Dym v. Gordon and concluded that that case
should be overruled.
In 1969 Judge Keating got his wish, for in what appears to
be, at least for the time being, the penultimate foreign guest
statute case in New York, he authored the opinion which in effect
did overrule Dym v. Gordon. In Tooker v. Lopez,87 the plaintiff's
daughter and two Michigan State classmates were en route to
Detroit when the car in which they were riding overturned. Both
the plaintiff's daughter-guest and the defendant's daughterdriver were killed, while the other guest, a Michigan resident,
was seriously injured. Plaintiff, defendant and their two daughters all resided in New York, where the automobile was registered and insured by a New York insurance company. In a
wrongful death action, an affirmative defense based on the
Michigan guest statute was rejected by the Court of Appeals in
a 4-3 decision, holding instead that New York law should control.
34 The other automobile in Dym was driven by a resident of Kansas,
however, not Colorado.
35 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966).
3 221 N.E.2d at 383, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
(Emphasis in orginal.)
3 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969). A useful and
lengthy analysis of the Tooker case may be found in Comment, Conflict of
Laws - Guest Statutes - Round 4, Foreign Guest Statutes in the New

York Courts, 45 N.Y.U. L. Rav.. 146 (1970).
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The court concluded that New York had the only real interest
in deciding whether a recovery should be granted and that the
application of Michigan law would defeat a legitimate interest
of the forum state without serving a legitimate interest of any
other state. The reasoning in Dym was rejected since the court
now felt that guest statutes were designed to prevent fraudulent claims against local insurers and to protect local automobile owners by requiring plaintiffs to show gross negligence which goals were not furthered under the facts either in Dym or
the instant case.38

Turning to New York policy, the court looked

to that state's Compulsory Insurance Law, which makes no distinction between guests, pedestrians or other injured parties, and
provides for extraterritorial coverage. Having determined the
relevant purposes of the ostensibly conflicting laws, the court
decided that New York not only had a stronger interest in having
its law applied, but since the car was not owned by a Michigan
domiciliary or insured there, the only interest.3 9 Thus, a strict
governmental interest analysis appears to have reasserted itself
4
in New York as the governing approach to decision. 0
Nor is this approach limited in New York to guest statute
or other tort cases. Trusts, decedent estate and contract cases
38 The court determined that the policy of preserving the defendant's
assets as a third party fund was incorrectly relied on in Dym since it was
not supported by the statutory history and since such assets could be
collected by a guest on a showing of gross negligence. 249 N.E.2d at 397, 301
N.Y.S.2d at 524. In Babcock, however, the Ontario guest statute then in
effect was absolute - that is, no recovery was allowed in Ontario no matter
how grave, gross, wilful or wanton the negligence. Presumably the Tooker
court did not feel it necessary to consider this point, since the Babcock
court had not yet thought of the preservation of assets purpose, possibly
because no third party was involved in that accident.
39 The case was considered by the majority as "one of the simplest in
the choice-of-law area." 249 N.E.2d at 398, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 525. This
conclusion is justified because under the interest analysis the case is considered to be a "false conflict," since the purposes and policies of only one
state's law are furthered by being applied to the facts.
40Judge Burke, concurring in Tooker, pointed out that for the first
time in a guest statute case the law of the place where the relationship was
centered was not applied, which meant to him that the result differs according to which choice-of-law theory or approach is utilized. 249 N.E.2d at
407, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 537. If the "grouping of the contacts" theory was
used, Dym would have to be followed, and Michigan law applied; the interest
analysis is different since the resulting law is that of New York. There
was, however, an appellate division case in New York where the facts
were substantially the reverse of Babcock. Two Ontario domiciliaries had
an accident while riding through New York, but the court applied New
York law, denying the guest statute defense! Kell v. Henderson, 26 App.
Div. 2d 595, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (3d Dep't 1966). See, Rosenberg & Trautman, Two Views on Kell v. Henderson, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 465 (1967).
Unlike the Babcock and Tooker cases, the Kell factual situation presents in
interest analysis terms a "true conflict." That is, it would not be irrational
for New York to impose liability on an Ontario host for negligent conduct
on its highways which involves the safety of third parties, motorists or
pedestrians. New York arguably has admonitory and deterrent policies
which could be applicable here. Furthermore, its compensatory policy is
obviously regarded as an important one, so that an even-handed, non-discriminatory treatment of all persons injured in New York could justify
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now seem to fall under the same approach. The trust and decedent estate cases got off to a shaky start, primarily because
of problems in characterization and application of the varying
traditional rules governing questions concerning real property,
personal property and intangible personal property. 41 The Second Restatement's emphasis on the law chosen by the parties
added another interrelated element 42 to considerations of "situs"
and "domicile." Nevertheless, the governmental interest analysis adopted by a precarious 4-3 Tooker majority in a tort case
eventually gained unanimous acceptance in non-tort cases, leading one commentator to opine that Judge Keating's approach was
43
nothing short of "revolutionary" in that field.
The development in Wisconsin, like that of New York, deman extension of compensation to Ontario people, assuming an injured New
York guest or third-party New Yorker would recover there against the
Ontario driver and his Ontario insurer. With an Ontario defendant, however, such a result obviously impairs Ontario's interest.
Other difficult problems for an interest analysis are suggested by the
Tooker case. The dissent argued that the majority holding created an inconsistency, for if the other guest, a Michigan resident, were suing she
would be denied recovery, while her fellow passenger in the same case is
allowed recovery. The majority disagreed, indicating she might indeed be
entitled to recover, at least in New York. 249 N.E.2d at 400-01, 301 N.Y.S.
2d at 528. It is clear, however, that she would not be able to recover in
Michigan, since its supreme court recently reconfirmed its across-the-board
adherence to lex loci in Abendschien v. Farrell, 382 Mich. 501, 170 N.W.2d
137 (1969).
The Babcock majority opinion author, not surprisingly, concurred in
Tooker, but in so doing, Judge Fuld pleaded for the Court of Appeals to
establish firm guidelines in guest cases in light of their six years of experience. In order to avoid producing even more uncertainity for litigants,
their lawyers and the courts, he set out some guidelines. 249 N.E.2d at
404 (N.Y. App. 1969).
Nevertheless, the majority approach in Tooker apparently is now being
happily followed for other tort issues in the lower New York courts. See,
e.g., Frummer v. Hilton Hotels International, Inc., 60 Misc. 2d 840, 304
N.Y.S.2d 335, 340 (Sup. Ct. 1969), where the court said: "In searching
for new tools for resolving conflict problems, the court has now adopted an
interest analysis, as Judge Keating's recent opinion in Tooker v. Lopez...
makes demonstrably clear."
In Hilton Hotels, the English comparative
negligence doctrine was selected rather than the New York contributory
negligence rule in a suit by a New York tourist injured in the London
Hilton.
41 The 1934 Restatement refers all questions regarding immovables
to the "situs" of the land. E.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) §250. Most questions pertaining to title to or interest in movables are also referred to the
situs law. Id. at §§255-310. Major exceptions are made for succession to
movables (law of decedent's domicile) (Id. at §§284, 285, 303, 306), and
rights of spouses in each other's property (marital domicile) (Id. at §§289,
290). 42
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) §332 et seq. (law chosen by parties
governs most contractual questions subject to some safeguards) and §1003
(validity of inter vivos trust of movables governed by law designated by
settlor).
4 Baade, Judge Keating and the Conflict of Laws, 36 BROOKLYN L.
REV. (1969).
The story starts with Matter of Bauer, 14 N.Y.2d 272 200 N.E.2d 207,
251 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1964), where an Englishwoman's English exercise of a
power of appointment created by a New York trust was held invalid because
"the law to be applied here is the law of New York which was the donor's

domicile and where there was executed the trust agreement ....

"
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onstrates the evolutionary process in conflicts thinking. But
unlike the present New York determination to use a governmental interest analysis, Wisconsin, when faced with a "true conflict," has explicitly adopted an approach whereby the court considers the five "choice-influencing considerations" of Professor
Leflar, only one of which is the advancement of the forum's governmental interest. 44 In its openness and directness, and in its
refusal to adopt mechanical rules, the Wisconsin approach is
properly considered an interest analysis.
Wisconsin began with the lex fori in tort actions, which was

treated as part of the law of remedies whether or not the facts
Utassi, 15 N.Y.2d 436, 209 N.E.2d 65, 261 N.Y.S.2d 4 (1965), a year later,
held that Swiss law governed the right of a Swiss governmental body to
the New York assets of a Swiss resident dying intestate and without heirs,
because the Swiss law was one of succession, not of escheat. Then in Wyatt
v. Fulrath, 16 N.Y.2d 169, 211 N.E.2d 637, 264 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1965), a
New York trust was held valid despite the law of the Spanish duke and
duchess' domicile, because of the New York situs and the parties' intention
that New York law govern. In James v. Powell, 19 N.Y.2d 249, 225 N.E.2d
741, 279 N.Y.S. 2d 10 (1967), the law of the situs determined whether
the transfer by the celebrated New York congressman, Adam Clayton Powell,
of Puerto Rican land defrauded a holder of a New York judgment, but
New York has the "strongest interest" in the question of punitive damages.
In 1967, Judge Keating's analysis of the governmental interests went
to work, with the result that the 1965 blandishments of Wyatt v. Fulrath
were emended by his decision in Matter of Crichton, 20 N.Y.2d 124 228
N.E.2d 799, 281 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1967), where Louisiana's policy underlying
community property law was found to be inapplicable to Louisiana personalty owned by New Yorkers; therefore New York law governed the
wife's testamentary interest. ("Contacts obtain significance only to the
extent they relate to the policies and purposes sought to be vindicated by
the conflicting laws." 281 N.Y.S.2d at 820, note 8.) The tale ends with
Judge Fuld's opinion in In re Estate of Clark, 21 N.Y.2d 478, 236 N.E.2d
152, 288 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1968), where the validity and effect of a widow's
right to take against her husband's will was held to be a question governed
by the law of their common domicile in Virginia, rather than the law of
the situs of the bulk of the $23,000,000 involved, which was New York. The
decedent could not, by providing in his will that New York law was to
govern the disposition of property there, cut off his widow's rights under
Virginia law, for the reason that the forced share is a rule designed to
defeat intention. Wyatt was found to be inapplicable since it involved
inter vivos transactions between the husband and wife.
With regard to contracts, the extremely conceptualistic lex loci rules,
which were supplanted in New York as early as in 1954 by one of the very
first opinions to make a clean break with traditional learning by considering
all relevant contacts rather than just the place of making or performance,
(Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954)), has in turn been
replaced by the governmental interest analysis. Intercontinental Planning,
Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 372, 248 N.E.2d 576, 300 N.Y.S.2d 817
(1969) (action against a New Jersey corporation to recover a finder's fee
for services with respect to a corporate acquisition; the oral contract was
made in New Jersey and was valid and enforceable there, but New York's
statute of frauds, unlike New Jersey's, stood as a defense to the action;
New York law applied on the basis of its "paramount interest" after analyzing respective interests and finding New Jersey had none; query as to
result if suit brought in a New Jersey court rather than in New York.)
44 See note 10 supra. Professor Leflar's approach was first set out in
his article, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 267, 282 (1966). The result-selective approach inherent in the "better
rule of law" consideration has engendered the most controversy in contemporary choice-of-law approaches. See, e.g., Juenger, note 3 supra at
213 et seq.
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of a particular case were multi-state in nature or involved substantive or procedural issues.45 The shift to lex loci delicti was
made as early as 1904.48 This mechanical rule of thumb was
applied in Buckeye v. Buckeye,47 an action arising from an accident in Illinois involving Wisconsin residents, with the result
that the Illinois interspousal immunity law was applied. In
1959, the lex loci rule was rejected and Buckeye overruled in a
case involving the same interspousal immunity issue, the celebrated Hawmschild decision, 8 where the court evaded the undesirable result by characterizing the question as one of family
law, not of tort law. As the court realized later, Haumschild
merely substituted another mechanical rule, the law of domicile,
for the equally mechanical lex loci approach. One case"4 overruled by Haumschild, for example, involving an immunity state
(Illinois) couple's accident in Wisconsin, could be justified under
an interest analysis. Thus, it would not be unreasonable for
Wisconsin in such a case to apply its own law in light of the
Wisconsin policy and interest in promoting the spread of risk,
fastening liability on a moral basis of fault, and allowing the
creation of a fund to repay Wisconsin creditors and medical bills,
at least when the accident occurs on the state's highways5 0
Lex loci delicti was then abandoned completely in the 1965
Wilcox v. Wilcox decision, 51 where the court opted for the law of
the state with "the most significant relationship." Two years
later in Heath v. Zellmer 5 2 the court adopted an approach based
on the relative interests of the states involved, with an exhaustive
analysis of the five choice-influencing considerations.5 3 The next
case after Heath indicated that the court had in fact actually
switched to Leflar's list,5 4 and shortly thereafter the same court
decided Conklin v. Horner,55 a true or "serious" conflict situation,
45 The Wisconsin history through 1967 is reviewed by their supreme

court in Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 2d 98, 156 N.W.2d
466 (1968), a "choice-influencing consideration" case.
4 Bain v. Northern Pac. R.R., 120 Wis. 412, 98 N.W. 241 (1904).
47203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931).
48 Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 180, 95 N.W.2d 814

(1959). See Hancock, The Rise and Fall of Buckeye v. Buckeye 1931-1959:
Marital Immunity for Torts in Conflict of Laws, 29 U. CHI. L Rsv. 237
(1962). In Haumschild, the accident occurred in California, a community

property state, injuring a Wisconsin spouse.
49 Forbes v. Forbes, 226 Wis. 477, 277 N.W. 112 (1938).
50 Such a result would accord with Wisconsin's interests as identified in
the Zelinger case, note 45 supra and is argued for by Hancock in his article,
note 48 supra.
51 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
5235 Wis. 2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967).
5 See note 10 supra.
54Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co., note 45 supra.
5538 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968).
Conklin and the choice-

Influencing considerations are discussed in Juenger, note 3 supra, at 230
et 8eq.
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in which it appeared to emphasize the "better law" rule.5 6
Conklin is important, for prior to deciding what the "better law"
is, the court made it clear that the first step was to examine
the force of the relevant policies underlying the competing laws.
In Conklin, relief was afforded to an Illinois guest injured in
Wisconsin by his Illinois host in a trip which began and was to
end in Illinois and where the host's automobile was licensed and
garaged in Illinois, the state where the insurance policy was issued and the insurer licensed. A "serious" conflict was presented since Wisconsin law requires only simple negligence in
host-guest situations, whereas Illinois had a guest statute. Predictability and simplification of the judicial task, the court said,
were of no significance in such a case, and it was obvious to the
court that "the imposition of liability upon an Illinois host is not
likely to reduce the likelihood that Illinois hosts will continue to
drive into Wisconsin with their guests, ' '15 so that maintaining
interstate order is no problem, nor is Illinois likely to retaliate.
The purpose of Wisconsin law was found to be compensation for
those injured by negligent acts and it was the duty of the court
to further the legitimate governmental policy of the forum.,8
Finally, Wisconsin's law was found to be the "better law" to
apply under the circumstances because guest statutes were seen
to be anachronistic vestiges of the early days of enterprise liability development and, the court felt, do not represent presentday socio-economic conditions.59
The experience in other states could be examined. For example, a development similar to that in Wisconsin occurred in
New Hampshire, where that supreme court, in expressly invoking
Professor Leflar's choice-influencing considerations, emphasized
the "sounder rule of law."'60 California's progress under the
56 The court quoted from the Zelinger case, note 45 supra, which indicated that Wisconsin "would apply the law of a non forum state if it
were the better law." 88 Wis. 2d at 484, 157 N.W.2d at 587.
57 38 Wis. 2d at 481, 157 N.W.2d at 585.
58 By applying the Wisconsin law in Conklin, the court openly recognized
that the Illinois policy of protecting the host and his insurer was being
defeated and that its decision meant that those whom Illinois would shield
would59 be answerable in damages. 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968).
Two justices dissented, concluding that Wisconsin had given paramount if not controlling emphasis to the fifth consideration, the better law,
contrary to earlier cases in the same court which, they thought, made it
clear that none of the considerations standing alone would be considered
controlling. 38 Wis. 2d at 486, 157 N.W.2d at 588. Professor Leflar, himself, intended no priority from the order of listing. See note 44 supra.
A "significant relationship" and "grouping of the contacts" approach
was formally adopted by Wisconsin in resolving a contract issue, no examination being made of the choice-influencing considerations. Urhammer
v. Olson, 39 Wis. 2d 447, 159 N.W.2d 688 (1968).
60 Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 355, 222 A.2d 205, 209-10 (1966) (a
guest-statute case, considered "easy" under the interest analysis, since it
presented a Babcock fact situation - parties residing at the forum which
ad no gest statute, injured in an accident in a guest-statute state). For
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steady and realistic guidance of Justice Traynor is also worthy of

note.6 '

Illinois is also allegedly an interest analysis state,

2

an

assertion which will now be examined.
III.

The "Revolution" Comes to Illinois

The most that can be said from a close reading of the three
"modern" Illinois Supreme Court cases through late 1970 is that
the vested rights, lex loci theory has been rejected outright only
in the interspousal immunity area.6 3 Whether it is the "significant relationship," "center of gravity" approach of the Second
Restatement or the state with the "predominant interest" standard which has replaced lex loci in interspousal tort actions is less
clear. Whether lex loci and the traditional learning has been

abandoned in any other kind of action, tortious or otherwise, has
not yet been decided, at least not by the Illinois Supreme Court.

The two subsequent conflicts type cases reaching the highest state
court resulted in the employment of disparate techniques in resolving the issues presented for decision. The rejection of a suit
based on the Wisconsin direct action resurrected the old shibboleth of the second line public policy defense,64 while one of the law
professor's favorite hypotheticals - the out-of-state accident,
forum-state dram shop act - utilized nothing more complex than

statutory construction. 5
The lower courts in Illinois have therefore been in a state
the earlier New Hampshire evolution paralleling Wisconsin, see Gray v.
Gray, 87 N.H. 82, 174 A. 508 (1934); Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H.
86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963) ; Johnson v. Johnson, 107 N.H. 30, 216 A.2d
781 (1966); Dow v. Larrabee, 107 N.H. 70, 217 A.2d 506 (1966).
61Leading Traynor conflict opinions include Grant v. McAuliffe, 41
Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953) (a "surprise characterization" of survival
statutes in order to apply California law); Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d
421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955) ; People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 48 Cal. 2d 595,
311 P.2d 480 (1957); Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906,
12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961)
(emphasizing party expectations and statutory
construction to avoid a conflict); Reich v. Percell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d
727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967) (analyzing interests to find no true conflict).
See, generally, the justice himself in Is this Conflict Really Necessary?
37 TEX. L. REv. 657 (1959), and the symposium on the Reich case in 15
U.C.L.A. REv. 551, note 1 supra.
62 Comment, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV., note 37 supra, at 153, note 49; Thomas
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 724, 249 N.E.2d 755, 301 N.Y.S.2d
973, 979 (1969); Manos v. Trans World Airlines, 295, F. Supp. 1170, 1173
(N.D. Ill. 1969).
One writer, however, apparently, assumes that Illinois is still a lex
loci delicti state, and after examining the recent Illinois tort cases urges
the Illinois Supreme Court to resist any change in light of the New York
experience. Waxman, Conflict in Illinois Courts on Choice of Law Theory
in Torts - Is It Lex Loci Delictus or Substantial Interest? 59 ILL. B.J.
212 (1970).
63 Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966), discussed
infra.
64 Marchlik v. Coronet Ins. Co., 40 Ill. 2d 327, 239 N.E.2d 799 (1968),
discussed infra.
65 Graham v. General
U.S. Grant Post No. 2665, V.F.W., 43 Ill. 2d
1, 248 N.E.2d 657, reversing in part, 97 Ill. App. 2d 139, 239 N.E.2d 856
1968), discussed infra.
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somewhere between mild and considerable confusion.66 The fed-

eral district courts, on the other hand, have a tendency to oversell
6 7
the interest analysis when they are making an Erie-type guess.

The result, then, is that like many other kinds of revolutions, the
conflict, one which began in 1966 in Illinois, bubbles along mainly
at a level somewhere below the establishment.
Ironically enough, the case that started it, and, at least at

this writing ended it, did not as a matter of actual fact involve
68
a conflict with a sister state's law at all. Wartell v. Formusa
was an action brought by an Illinois wife against her deceased

Illinois husband's estate for injuries incurred by his allegedly
wilful and wanton misconduct69 which resulted in an automobile
collision while they were "passing through" Florida. Illinois law
provides for interspousal immunity by statute, 0 while Florida
prohibits such actions by common law.71 Nevertheless, the court
found that it was necessary to determine which state's law was
applicable because of a claim that both were unconstitutional.
Illinois law was selected:
We can think of no reason why Florida law should control the question whether a husband and wife domiciled in Illinois should be able
to maintain an action against each other for a tort committed during coverture. The fact that the alleged tortious act took place in
Florida is of no significance in determining which law should govern the determination of this issue. The law of the place of the
wrong should of course determine whether or not a tort has in
fact been committed, but the distinct question of whether one
spouse can maintain an action in tort against the other spouse is
clearly a matter which should be governed by the law of the domicile of the persons involved ....
Illinois has the predominant interest in the preservation of the husband-wife relationship of its
citizens, and to apply the laws of Florida to the question of whether
66See, e.g., the Second District's opinion in Graham, note 65, supra,
and in Ingersoll v. Klein, 106 Ill. App. 2d 330, 245 N.E.2d 288 (1969);
and the First District's opinion in Kabak v. Thor Power Tool Co., 106 Ill.
App. 2d 190, 245 N.E.2d 596 (1969), appeal dismissed by the Illinois
Supreme Court.
67 A federal court in a diversity action is required to apply the law,
including the conflict of law rules, of the state in which it sits. Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
In this connection,
then, see the incorrect Erie guess in Swanson v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 275
F. Supp. 544 (E.D. Ill. 1967), and query as to the judgment in Manos v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1166 (N.D. Ill. 1968) [hereinafter
cited as Manos I], and Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 295 F. Supp.
1170 (N.D. Ill. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Manos II], both cases discussed
at note 110 infra.
68 34 Ill. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966).
69 No doubt Mrs. Wartell alleged wilful and wanton misconduct to cover
herself in the eventuality she was successful in first overcoming the interspousal immunity defense. Illinois statutory law requires in a guest-host
situation that "wilful and wanton misconduct" be proved in order to collect.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 , §9-201 (1969).
70 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, §1 (1969)
("...
neither husband nor wife
may sue the other for a tort to the person committed during coverture.").
71 Amendola v. Amendola, 121 So.2d 805 (Fla. App. 1960) ; Corren v.
Corren, 47 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1950).
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interspousal tort suits may be permitted between residents would
be illogical and without sound basis. This position has been adopted
by the Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws, Tentative Draft
No. 9, par. 390g, which provides in part that "whether one member
of a family is immune from tort liability to another member of
the family is determined by the local law of the state of their domicile." An increasing number of courts have also held this to be
the better reasoned view [citing among other leading cases, Babcock and Haumschild]. We also adopt this view .... 72
It should be immediately obvious that the court's choice of
Illinois rather than Florida law is sound and can hardly be
faulted. The rejection of lex loci delicti in an intra-family tort
situation where the accident occurs outside the family domiciliary
state is to be applauded in Wartell's factual context. The domicile of the parties is at least a relevant "contact" with reference
to the purposes and policies of a state law regulating the rights
of family members inter sese, while an interspousal rule at the
place of accident can hardly be said to be one which indicates
an interest in regulating conduct on its highways. Thus, the
Wartell resolution is good law, not bad, and sound in result.
But contrast the technique used in achieving such a result.
The law of the domicile is now said to govern the capacity to sue
in husband-wife and probably other intra-family tort actions.
Lex loci may have been replaced by a rule which is just as mechanical in application and just as "jurisdiction-selecting" in approach. The interspousal question is referred to the domicile as
the state with the "predominant interest" without discussion of
the content or the policy of that law. This is not an interest
analysis and it is likely to result in hard cases. It is suggested
that some guidance for the hard cases should have been given.
Three examples should suffice.
The determination of domicile is not always easy for it is an
extremely elusive concept,7 3 yet the Illinois courts will henceforth
be required to determine it in many cases where it was theretofore considered immaterial.74 Will the elusiveness objection be
met by substituting a factual concept of "settled residence,"7 5 to
cover the large number of married couples who may have a
technical domicile in Illinois but are in other states for extended
34 Ill. 2d at 59-60, 213 N.E.2d at 545-46. (Emphasis added.)
took thirtythree sections to define it. Id. at §§9-41.
74 This was a complaint leveled at the majority opinion by a concurring
judge in the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion in Haumschild, which
applied the domicile law in a parallel interspousal immunity case. 7 Wis.
2d 130 at 142, 95 N.W.2d 814 at 820. See note 48 supra.
72

73 The elaborate systematics of the RESTATEMENT (FIRST)

The statement in the text should not be taken to mean that domicile
should not become more relevant than it was under the traditional approach.
In the interest analysis, it is clearly one of the most potentially relevant
contacts there is.
75 See Currie ch. 3.
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periods, when accidents occur and that state has abolished interspousal immunity? Some marrieds, for example, are students
at colleges and universities, some stationed in Illinois or elsewhere for military duty, some on temporary job assignment and,
as in Wartell, some on vacation. And what about married couples
who are separated, and live in different states? What, in Wartell's terms, is "the law of the domicile of the persons involved. '

7

A serious problem arises in this context when the question
presented is whether the domicile law forbidding suits between
spouses applies to a third party defendant in a non-immunity
state seeking a right to contribution against the negligent husband whose wife has been injured by them both. An early case
arising shortly after Wisconsin adopted the domicile rule in
Haumschild, is instructive since the Wisconsin Supreme Court
felt constrained to follow Haumschild and applied the Illinois law
to the interspousal phase of a complaint against the Illinois husband. Thus, the Wisconsin defendant and his insurance company
were deprived of a right to contribution from the husband, while
the Illinois wife was permitted to sue the Wisconsin joint tort
feasor for damages arising out of an accident in that state. 7 Recognizing that such a decision undermined the Wisconsin policy allowing contribution between joint tort feasors, while the opposite
result would not impair any interest of Illinois in forbidding
suits between married couples, since the Illinois wife is not in
court against her husband, the Wisconsin court in a later choiceinfluencing case, and on an interest analysis basis, in effect re78
versed itself.
It was long the general rule that the right of one tortfeasor
was governed by the law of the place of the tort.7 9 Interestingly
enough, analysis of the facts and factors on this issue, by applying the modern conflicts approach, effectuates the same result, but
only if a mechanical domicile rule is rejected, as the latter Wisconsin decision did. ° The point is that the contribution case
78 34 Ill.
2d at 59, 213 N.E.2d at 545.
77 Haynie

v. Hanson, 16 Wis. 2d 299, 114 N.W.2d 443 (1962).
Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 2d 98, 156 N.W.2d 466
(1968). See note 80 infra. The result was foreshadowed in a guest statute
contribution case, Heath v. Zellmer 35 Wis 2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967),
which7 also applied the law of the iorum state where the accident occurred.
9 Annot., 95 A.L.R. 2d 1096 (1964).
80 In Zelinger, the plaintiffs a husband and his minor daughter who
were riding in the family car which the mother was driving at the time it
collided with a truck in Wisconsin, were Illinois residents. In their action
against the Wisconsin truck owner and his insurer, the latter sought contribution from the wife and her insurer. Wisconsin law was found to be
applicable to the contribution cause of action, by reference to the five choiceinfluencing considerations: the Wisconsin defendants were entitled to the
benefits of the Wisconsin law of contribution and the subsidiary rules upon
which it rested, that is, the questions of interspousal-parental immunity and
host-guest limitations, which were available defenses in Illinois but not Wisconsin, were subsidiary issues upon which contribution stood or fell, since
78
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introduces entirely different considerations since the risk of husband and wife collusion against a liability insurer is not present
in an action for contribution."1
A third problem for the Illinois courts in particular and the
system in general can be seen by reference to a post-Wartell possibility in light of the Wisconsin court's recent decision in Conklin v. Horner. 2 It will be recalled that the Conklin court resolved
what it found to be a "serious" conflict in favor of Wisconsin's
simple negligence law, as opposed to the Illinois "wilful and
wanton" guest statute, where an accident in Wisconsin involved
an Illinois host and guest. If the Wartell rejection of lex loci
is extended to an issue other than interspousal actions, it certainly would not be surprising to see such an extension of the
domicile principle to a host-guest case where two Illinois domiciliaries cross one of the state lines for an afternoon's spin and
are involved in an accident there.8 3 Nor would this be an undesirable result if an Illinois registered automobile insured by an
Illinois insurance company were involved in an accident involving no out-of-state parties or residents. Such a result would
surely coincide with the Babcock-Tooker development in New
York and be applauded by the Second Restatement, which opts
for the local law of the "common domicile."8 4
Conversely, it is not difficult to imagine Wisconsin extending
in Wisconsin contribution must be based on joint or common liability; Illinois interest in preservation of family integrity was not seen to be in jeopardy and its guest statute and immunity policies would not be infringed
upon by applying Wisconsin law; Wisconsin interests, however, are advanced; forum shopping was not a problem since the accident took place in
Wisconsin, a logical place to sue in light of convenience to witnesses and the
existence of the forum's direct action statute.
81 For an early case not purporting to follow the modern rule, but holding that the purposes of interspousal immunity are not relevant to a thirdparty complaint, emphasizing the accident-state's interest in its residents
and their insurers, see LaChance v. Service Trucking Co., 215 F. Supp. 162
(D.C. Md. 1963).
82 The case is discussed in the text at note 55 supra.
83 Cf. the reasoning of the Illinois appellate court in a post-Wartell case
involving an accident on the Iowa side of the Mississippi River, the only
Iowa "contact" in the case. Ingersoll v. Klein, 106 Ill. App. 2d 330, 245
N.E.2d 288 (1969), motion for leave of appeal granted (No. 42152). The
Illinois and not the Iowa Wrongful Death act was found to supply the governing law, lex loci delicti being rejected as too mechanical a rule when all
the parties to the law suit were Illinois residents, no citizen of Iowa was involved, and Illinois as the forum state and domicile of the potential beneficiaries advances its "more significant interest" and policy with no harm to
Iowa interests. The choice-influencing considerations were alluded to, but
the opinion also has elements of a sterile and quantitative rather than qualitative contact counting reminiscent of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

formulas

(i.e., sole eye witness an Illinois citizen, people arriving on the scene all
from Illinois, photographer an Illinois resident, the places where Illinois defendant drank prior to the accident were Illinois establishments). 106 Ill.
App. 2d at 337, 245 N.E.2d at 292.
84
Likewise, the circumstances under which a guest passenger has
a right of action against the driver of an automobile for injuries suffered as a result of the latter's negligence may be determined by the
local law of their common domicile, if at least this is the state from
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Conklin v. Horner to an accident on its highways involving an
Illinois married couple, since it has already applied Wisconsin
law to afford relief to the Illinois guest injured there by his Illinois host. This result is all the more likely in light of the Wisconsin view that guest statutes are anachronistic vestiges of the
early days. It is difficult to believe that the same "better law"
concept would not be utilized to prefer the Wisconsin law allowing recovery to spouses injured on Wisconsin highways rather
than the Illinois immunity law, especially in light of the almost
8
universal existence of liability insurance. 5
If either of the above-posited cases comes to pass, it is
clear that the system would be caught in a log jam. The result
in either case then depends on whether the suit is brought in
Wisconsin or neighboring Illinois. Uniformity, predictability of
results, and certainty are down the drain, and forum shopping
probably the inevitable result. Faced with such a dilemma, one
forum court must defer to the other potential forum, or reinterpret the policies and interests underlying its law. It is therefore
suggested that the domiciliary principle not be fashioned in such
a way so as to become too universally applicable.
One solution for such an arguably intractable problem, for
example, would be for Illinois to construe its guest statute as not
applying to accidents which occur outside the state. On the
other hand, a Wisconsin court could find that its dual policy favoring compensation for parties injured on its highways and
deterrence of negligent conduct there would not be seriously impaired by adopting the domicile rule for the Illinois couple only
visiting within its borders. Better yet, Illinois, as one of the few
remaining states with the interspousal prohibition, could revoke
the statute, just as it did when it recently phased out the death
damage limitation applicable to accidents occurring within the
state. 6 Finally, the forum court might well be in a position
to dismiss such a case on the basis of forum non conveniens if
which they departed on their trip and that to which they intended to
return, rather than by the local law of the state where the injury occurred.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), Part II §145, Comment d.
85 Ironically, a Wisconsin court squarely faced with such a situation,
would, in order to apply its own law, have to retract its overruling of the
Forbes case discussed at note 49 supra. Haumschild, in its "lump-sum" adoption of the new domicile rule in interspousal cases, expressly overruled the
earlier Forbes decision, which had applied Wisconsin law as the lex loci
delicti to allow an Illinois wife to recover against her Illinois husband.
Haumschild, however, involved Wisconsin domiciliaries injured in an immunity state, so that in light of the post-Haumschild approach to conflict
cases now in effect in Wisconsin, it would not be difficult for a Wisconsin
court to reinstate Forbes, but for different reasons than lex loci delicti.
86 Wrongful Death Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, §§1-2 (1969).
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the accident occurred out of state and witnesses were more
87
readily available in the other interested locale.
The foregoing remarks should not be read as a criticism of
the Illinois Supreme Court's action in the Wartell case. Obviously the result reached, as indicated, is to be applauded, and it is
true that in slightly unchartered seas as well as in well-known
ones, a court is only deciding one case at a time, the one before
it,The Wartell court did not indicate in fact that it was doing
anything more. But therein lies the rub, as well as the fun, for
the next court, the commentators, and the litigants and their
lawyers.
By citing the Second Restatement with approval, by mentioning Babcock (which after all was a guest statute case and not
an interspousal one like the other cases listed), and by finding
Illinois as the state with the "predominant interest" in the issue
presented, the court in Wartell was soon viewed by others as
adopting an interest analysis approach,"" or at least a "dominant
interest" test, rather than as only making an exception to the
otherwise applicable dictates of lex loci delicti. It is not at all
clear whether the sign posts were being misread or not. Two
years later, however, the Illinois Supreme Court, without so much
as mentioning Wartell, raised the spectre of the public policy defense in a case involving the Wisconsin direct action statute.
The 1968 reversion to lex loci occurred in Marchlik v. Coro87 Such a procedure was the preference of two of the Illinois justices
who concurred in the result reached by the court in the context of a direct
action statute. Marchlik v. Coronet Ins. Co., 40 Ill. 2d 327, 334, 239 N.E.2d
799, 803 (1968).
88 The Wartell case, it should be pointed out, soon developed a certain
notoriety as a leading case in the choice-of-law field, as a review of the cases
citing it in the digests indicates. Nor did the law reviews or scholars fail
to notice it. See Comment, note 37 supra; Juenger, at 202 n. 8 and 203
n.9, note 3 supra; Crampton & Currie 254; Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers, 80 HARV. L. REv., 377 (1966).
Important cases sometimes categorizing and sometimes discussing Wartell outside of Illinois, adopting an interest analysis approach-unless otherwise noted, include Reich v. Purcell, 69 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 31 (1967) (death damages); Balts v. Balts, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d
66 (1966) (parental immunity); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699
(Alaska 1968) (interspousal immunity); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz.
562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968) (interspousal immunity) ; Abendschein v. Farrell,
11 Mich. App. 662, 162 N.W.2d 165 (1968), aff'd on different grounds, 382
Mich. 510, 170 N.W.2d 137 (1969) (guest statute, rejecting new learning
at least in automobile cases) ; Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So.2d 509 (Miss. 1968)
(contributory or comparative negligence in a wrongful death action); Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969) (guest statute); Thomas v. United
Airlines, 24 N.Y.2d 714, 249 N.E.2d 755, 301 N.Y.S.2d 973 (1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 991 (1969) (death damages); Brendle v. General Tire &
Rubber Co., 408 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1969) (survival statute and death damages, following rejection of new learning in application of North Carolina
law).
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net Insurance Co.,8 9 where the court refused to apply to an automobile accident occurring in Wisconsin a Wisconsin direct action
statute, which permits suit to be brought against an insurer
without first obtaining a judgment against the insured notwithstanding a clause in the insurance policy specifically forbidding
such an action. Here, both the plaintiff-rider and the driver of
the other automobile were Wisconsin residents,90 the plaintiff's
host a Michigan resident, and the insurance policies, both containing "no action" clauses, issued in Illinois by Illinois insurance
companies. Illinois has no specific legislation either allowing or
prohibiting such direct actions against insurance companies. The
Illinois Supreme Court's framing of the issue and its approach
was nothing short of antediluvian in interest analysis terms.

For the court, the issue to be considered was whether the
public policy of Illinois precluded a direct action against an insurer where the policy sued on had a "no action" clause and
when the "statutory law of the place where the tort occurs" 91 allowed such an action. In order to pursue this issue, the court
first characterized the Wisconsin statute as "substantive" rather
than "procedural" by primarily examining Wisconsin decisional
law, an approach contrary to the general rule prevailing in Illi-

nois that a forum will use its own internal law to determine such
a question.92

The court then apparently characterized the lia-

bility under the Wisconsin statute as a matter of tort, rather
than that of contact.99

The court indicated, however, that even

89 40 Ill. 2d 327, 239 N.E.2d 799 (1968). The case was included in a
symposium reviewing the Illinois Supreme Court work in that year's term,
Conflict of Laws: Illinois Tort Choice-of-Law Problems Move Toward
FurtherConfusion. 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 841 (1970).
90 The insured's automobile was registered in Wisconsin and the injured
party also received hospital and medical care there. Neither drivers were
named as defendants in the suit against the insurance companies.
91 40 Ill. 2d at 329, 239 N.E.2d at 801. The court indicated this was the
issue "as stated by the parties." Id. Having answered the question in the
affirmative, it then decided that such a result was not precluded by the fullfaith-and-credit clause of the United States Constitution. A post-Marchlik
decision involving a Louisiana judgment obtained against one of the same
Illinois insurers involved in Marchlik, under Louisiana's direct action statute,
was sued upon in Illinois and enforced pursuant to the full-faith-and-credit
clause mandate. Employer's Liability Assurance Corp. v. Coronet Ins. Co.,
106 Ill.
App. 2d 24, 245 N.E.2d 629 (1969).
92 Millsap v. Central Wisconsin Motor Transp. Co., 41 Il1.
App. 2d 1,
189 N.E.2d 783 (1963); Wetzel v. Hart, 41 Ill. App. 2d 371, 190 N.E.2d 619
(1963); cf. Jackson v. Shuttleworth, 42 Ill. App. 2d 257, 192 N.E.2d 217
(1963).
93 Characterization of an issue as being one in tort rather than contract,
or contract rather than tort, is a classic escape or manipulative device under
the traditional system. Vicarious liabilitv is the usual casebook example.
See, e.q., Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 A.
163 (1928). One of the "characterization" cases discussed by the Marchiik
court - Justice Travnor's opinion for the California court in Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953) - was misread in intention and
spirit, as Professor Currie's analysis of Grant would have made clear to the
Illinois judges. Currie ch. 6.
The characterization process, it should be pointed out, cannot, and in-
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this was an oversimplification, for if entertaining the cause required application of the substantive Wisconsin law, in accor-

dance with the traditional lex loci doctrine, contrary Illinois public policy might still forbid enforcement of the action. 4 After
examining Illinois statutory and decisional law, the court found
that in fact this was the case, so that Illinois courts could not be
used as the forum for cases under the Wisconsin direct action
statute.95
As suggested earlier, 96 the public policy defense bears very
little resemblance to an analysis of a state's "policies" and "interests" under the modern approach. Marchlik is a good example
of how they differ. If, for example, the court were relying on
the Illinois ban against informing a jury of insurance, its reasoning is probably questionable in light of the almost universal
knowledge of the existence of automobile liability insurance, a
point made by the New York Court of Appeals in Oltarsh v.

Aetna Ins. Co.,9" where the opposite result on the public policy
point was reached in a Puerto Rico direct action statute case.
Other relevant Illinois policies and interests could have been

cited, however, which would have justified the Marchlik result.
Illinois, for example, might have an interest in protecting domestic and foreign insurance companies doing business in the state,
an interest which would be contravened by applying Wisconsin
law, thus removing the protection of no action clauses in the
deed should not, be avoided in any approach to choice-of-law questions. The
process has a close parallel in another important result of the interest analysis approach - the separation of issues. Such a separation was appropriately made by the Illinois Appellate Court in Kabak v. Thor Power Tool
Co., 106 Ill. App. 2d 190, 245 N.E.2d 596 (1969), one of the "modern" Illinois cases, albeit not in the state's highest court. In Kabak, the court applied Ohio law to the issue of an Illinois defendant manufacturer's right of
contribution against the injured plaintiff's Ohio employer. This issue, taken
in the abstract, seemed to bear a close relationship, in terms of policy, to the
more protective Illinois rule. However, the court in reaching its decision
referred to the Ohio rule, on the theory that the indemnity-contribution issue was in effect subsidiary to the underlying issue of tort liability between
the Ohio plaintiff and Ohio employer, which, since the accident took place in
Ohio, was obviously referenced to Ohio law.
The Kabak court's opinion, however, was somewhat confused in its attempt to determine the appropriate guidelines for decision in the case before it. Thus, the Court combined Marchlik's public policy pronouncements
with the wide-open interest analysis, choice-influencing considerations approach of the Graham dram shop act appellate court opinion (later reversed
on appeal and discussed in the text at note 102 infra) in concluding that
"in Illinois the lex loci delicti, or law of the place of the wrong, generally
governs where the substantive rights of the parties will be affected, provided there is no compelling public policy of this state to the contrary." 106
Ill. App. 2d at 179, 245 N.E.2d at 601. The substantive discussion which
preceded and followed this announcement, however, mechanically counted
contacts, citing the SECOND RESTATEMENT'S "most significant relationship"
test.
94 40 Ill. 2d at 330, 239 N.E.2d at 801.
95 40 Ill. 2d at 333-34, 239 N.E.2d at 803.
96 See note 25 supra.

97 15 N.Y.2d 111, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1965), discussed at note 27 supra.
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large number of insurance policies issued here."' The point is,
if the court had framed its decision in terms of modern conflicts
analysis, it might well have decided Marchlik the same way, but

for sounder reasons.
Even if Marchlik is deemed to be an illustration of "the difficulties inherent in a broad application of the public policy concept in conflict of laws cases," 99 at least the Illinois Supreme
Court clarified its position as to suits based on out-of-state direct
action statutes. A subsequent diversity action involving an Illinois resident injured in a Wisconsin collision, for example, received the same even-handed treatment in the Seventh Circuit.o1 °

The question is whether in so clarifying its position, the court
further confused the choice-of-law problem in Illinois.
In a model interest analysis opinion rejecting the strict lex
loci rule, an appellate court applied the Illinois Dram Shop Act 10 1

extraterritorially so as to afford relief to an Illinois resident
against Illinois tavern owners, the injury being inflicted by an
Illinois drunken driver a short distance within the Wisconsin

state boundaries.

The appellate court opinion in Graham v.

General U.S. Grant Post No. 2665,102 which was decided at about
the same time as Marchlik, thereby employed a favorite technique
in the modern arsenal of conflicts analysis - statutory construc-

tion.

Having determined that the Dram Shop Act should be

so applied to the precise factual circumstances before it, the
court found that this result conflicted with the traditional lex

loci choice of law rule followed in earlier Illinois dram shop

cases. 10 3 Consequently, an exhaustive analysis of the applicable
learning led the appellate court to conclude that:
...an identification of the choice-influencing considerations will
aid in the ultimate achievement of predictability for some type of
98 See Nw. U. L. REv. at 843, note 89 supra.

91The quote is from a pre-Wartell lex loci decision applying Wisconsin
law. Millsap v. Central Wisconsin Motor Transp. Co., 41 Ill.
App. 2d 1, 22,
189 N.E.2d 783, 793, 803 (1963), where the court in effect rejected the view
that the Wisconsin comparative negligence law was contrary to Illinois public
policy as expressed by its contributory negligence rule.
100 Reichus v. Maryland Cas. Co., 411 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1969). One
year prior to Marchlik, however, a federal district court reached the opposite result, making an Erie guess that Illinois would enforce the Wisconsin
direct statute in favor of an Illinois resident injured in Wisconsin suing two
Wisconsin insurers. Swanson v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 275 F. Supp. 544
(1967). See note 67 supra.
101 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, §135 (1969).
The situs state, Wisconsin, does
not have a dram shop act, nor is there any equivalent common-law liability
under that state's law.
102 97 Ill. App. 2d 330, 239 N.E.2d 856 (1968).
108 See, e.g., Colligan v. Cousar, 38 IIl. App. 2d 392. 187 N.E.2d 292
(1963) ; Butler v. Wittland, 18 Ill. App. 2d 578, 153 N.E.2d 106 (1958). A
useful analysis of 90 years of Illinois experience in dram shop act cases
may be found in a comment urging the extraterritorial application of the
Illinois statute. Conflicts of Law Problems and the ExtraterritorialOperation of the Illinois Dram Shop Act, 1958 ILL. L. FOR. 287.
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transactions. Thus, it would seem advisable for each decision to
forthrightly assert the basic factors underlying its rationale.
In the case at bar, Illinois is the state having the dominant
interest ....
Illinois has such an interest in the welfare and protection of its
citizens and those dependent upon them, and has such an interest in
regulating the evils attendant with the liquor traffic and the redress
of injury or loss of support arising therefrom, that its courts
should, under the circumstances of this case, give extraterritorial
effect to the Illinois Dram Shop Act. Such action would give protection to justified expectations, enforce the fundamental policy
underlying the Dram Shop Act, and would render justice in the
case.104
Nor did the court stop there, for it announced the guidelines it
would follow and why:
Future determinations of the choice of law rule to be applied in
kindred cases should therefore be governed by the choice-influencing considerations suggested herein and by other similar and pertinent factors, which permit analysis of the policies and interests
underlying the particular issue before the court.
Our fast changing and moving era with its attendant new social
and economic problems, requires a re-evaluation of the choice of
law rule in multistate tort situations, to the end that such rule will
be made for the people and problems of today. The nice tidy perfection of uniformity and simplicity should not prevail over elementary choice-influencing considerations, public policy, decency
and justice. 10
On appeal, a unanimous Illinois Supreme Court reversed.10 6
To the higher court, the problem presented was not one of
conflict or choice of law in the usual sense at all. In effect, the
court felt there was no conflict between Illinois and Wisconsin
law since both rejected liability under the facts presented. The
Supreme Court, like the appellate court, thus used the same
technique - statutory construction - but reached a different result, finding that the Illinois act was not intended by the legislature to apply to any accident occurring outside the state. Almost as an aside, the Court did admit that a number of courts,
including its own, had approved and adopted the "center of
gravity" or "significant relationship" rule "in common law tort
actions brought by one member of a family against another,
where the injury occurred in a state other than the family's domicile."' 07 Graham,however, presented a different situation than
that present in Wartell, the dispositive question for the court, being the extraterritorial effect of the Illinois Dram Shop Act.
104 97 Ill. App. 2d at 153-54, 239 N.E.2d at 863.
Accord, Schmidt v.
Driscoll Hotel, 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957).
105 97 Ill. App. 2d at 154-55, 239 N.E.2d at 863-64.
106 43 Ill.
2d 1, 248 N.E.2d 657 (1969).
107 43 II1. 2d at 4, 248 N.E.2d at 659, citing and quoting from the War-;
tell opinion.
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Although both Graham opinions utilize statutory construction in resolving the issue presented, 10 8 obviously, the considerations differ according to whether a conflict is found or not. To
the appellate court, the "conflict" was not with another state's
conflicting law or policy, but with the lex loci doctrine. To the
Illinois Supreme Court, there was no conflict between competing
rules of law, nor, in such a view of the case, was it therefore
necessary to specify how it would resolve such a conflict if there
were one, or to indicate how a court should choose between conflicting approaches where in fact a real choice-of-law question is
presented. 09
It may well be, therefore, that the apparent reluctance of the
Illinois Supreme Court to indicate more openly where it stands
will result in further confusion here. None the less, by focusing
on the "predominant interest" language of Wartell, the United

States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois has
made it clear that it not only knows where Illinois law has been,
and therefore what doctrine to apply sitting in diversity cases,
but also is willing to establish interest analysis "guidelines," at
least for determination of the issues arising from one of those
multi-state disasters. Two extremely interesting opinions emanated from essentially the same proceedings in five consolidated
cases.110 All of the cases arose out of the crash, on November 23,
1964, in Rome, Italy, of a Boeing 707 jet airliner operated by
TWA. Widows, minors, administrators, executors and an injured passenger who survived were involved on one side and
defendant TWA and the manufacturer, Boeing Company, on the
108 In
holding the Dram Shop Act without extraterritorial effect, the
Illinois Supreme Court emphasized two canons of statutory construction:
the presumption that when a statute is silent as to extraterritorial effect, it
has none (e.g., Union Bridge & Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 287 Ill.
396, 122 N.E. 609 (1919)), and that subsequent inaction by the legislature
confirms the correctness of prior judicial interpretation (e.g., Republic Steel
Co. v. Industrial Comm., 26 Ill. 2d 32, 185 N.E.2d 877 (1962)).
109 Troublesome questions might arise if the Graham facts are changed
only in that the accident occurs across the Iowa state line instead of Wisconsin, since Iowa does have a dram shop act. Iowa Dram Shop Act §129.2.
The effect of the Iowa statute and its common law rule was an issue in
Liff v. Haezbroeck, 51 Ill. App. 2d 71, 200 N.E.2d 525 (1964). If both acts
are interpreted as not having any extraterritorial application (Illinois when the accident is out-of-state; Iowa - because the tavern owner is outof-state), the result is striking. No recovery is allowed in a situation where
if the two mentioned factors are attributable to one or the other state, the
injured plaintiff collects. In Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269
F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), the court apparently ruled out any application
of'the Michigan Liquor Control Act or the Illinois statute on non-extraterritoial effect grounds, but allowed recovery since the place of accident provided for a common law cause of action. Cf. the dubious reasoning on the
common law count in a related case where the accident state was Indiana.
Colligan v. Cousar, 38 Ill. App. 2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292 (1963).
!10 Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1166 (N.D. Ill.
1969) (Manos I); Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1170
(1969) (Manos H).
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other. Probate in California and Arizona, releases executed in
Kansas and California, and Greek and Canadian residents and
heirs were also factors. In Manos I, it was found that if an
Illinois court had been called on to determine the effect of releases executed in various states, the law of the heirs' or injured
party's domiciliary state, as the case might be, would be selected, despite the fact that the release was executed in some
other state.,
In Manos II, the court held in effect that where
Illinois nonresidents were suing the airplane manufacturer, the
law of Italy applies on the issue of whether a tort occurred. The
law of Italy also applied on the issue of the applicable statute
of limitation; the law of those states "most interested" will be
applied on the damage issue in "true conflicts," which the court
indicated would generally be the state where probate was pending or, for injured plaintiffs, their domiciliary state. Finally,
the law of the state of Washington (i.e., where Boeing delivered
the plane under contract to TWA) applied 12on the alleged claim
of breach of express or implied warranty.
The proliferation of issues and potentially applicable state
laws in the multi-nation disaster case like Manos I and Manos II
should not dishearten either the reader or the Illinois courts.
After all, as a close reading of these two opinions will reveal, it
appears that the district court seems to be on the right track
here, even if some reservations could be made.11 3 Other cases
could be posed - instead of TWA, it could just as well have been
an Alitalia flight'14 - which are not easily resolved. Nevertheless, it is the hard cases that the courts are called upon to resolve
in some rational manner, and hopefully Illinois will not for too
long forego the opportunity.
IV.

Conclusion-,
We appear to have come a little more than a full circle, at
least in one sense. Starting with the automobile accidents in Bab"' Under traditional Illinois contract conflicts law, the law of the state
of the place of execution applies to govern the question of the effect of such
a release on a joint tort-feasor. See, e.g., Woodbury v. United States Cas.
Co., 284 Ill. 227, 120 N.E. 8 (1918).
112 The warranty point follows a well-established Illinois conflict principle announced in an important product liability case. Hardman v. Helene
Curtis Indus., Inc., 48 Ill. App. 2d 42, 58-63, 198 N.E.2d 681 (1964).
11' For example, in Manos II at 1173-74 n. 2, one of the suits involved
two next of kin from California, while the decedents' mother, father, and
half-sister were Washington residents. On the death damage issue, then,
the fact that the probate is in Arizona is arguably irrelevant under an in-

terest analysis.

How, then, if that is what is required, can a court decide

between California and Washington, assuming the laws are in conflict?
14 See, for example, Tramontana v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio
Grandeuse, 350 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Brazilian death damage limita-

tion of 100,000 cruzeiros ($170.00!), D.C. forum and deceased's domicile
in Maryland no limitation).
I'l Credit is again due here to Cramton & Currie.

19701

Conflicts of Laws and the Interest Analysis

cock and WartelU v. Formusa, and the Nantucket, Massachusetts
airplane crash in Kilberg, this paper ends with the complications
of the multi-state, multi-nation Manos disaster in Rome, where
of necessity the court was faced with not only tort issues but
those of contract as well. I would think the implications of this
excursion for at least Illinois litigants and their attorneys are
clear: since judicial acceptance of the new learning is by no
means certain, the careful lawyer must be prepared to argue all
the various theories, traditional and modern, in support of his
case.
On the other hand, no one has abandoned the teaching of
the traditional theory, nor should they. Quite apart from jurisprudential considerations, as far as a personal preference is
concerned, one must first admit that the interest analysis is not
perfect. Like other methods of approaching choice-of-law questions, it has its flaws. But it has the cardinal virtue of recognizing that to the extent laws are adopted and rules of decision laid
down in order to accomplish social goals, they should be applied
so as to carry out their purpose, whether the case is multi-state
in nature or not. Once this much is recognized openly, it is
hoped that rational solutions to cases of true conflict may then
become possible.

